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between buyers and sellers is analyzed. 
 
Keywords: communal land, dispossession risk, land reservation prices, capital-intensive 
interventions. 
 
JEL Classifications: D23; O17; Q15 
 IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL-INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT   
INTERVENTIONS FOR COMMUNAL RESOURCE OWNERS: THE CASE OF 
COMMUNAL FARMERS IN ECUADOR 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
West of Guayaquil, Ecuador is the Santa Elena Peninsula (PSE), an area of 6,050 
km
2 (see Figure 1). Until the middle of the 20
th Century, PSE was a breadbasket, 
supplying vegetables, animal products, and timber (Alvarez).  Due to excessive resource 
exploitation and climatic changes, the PSE was transformed into an almost treeless, semi-
arid landscape (Alvarez).  Many migrated from the land to urban areas, primarily 
Guayaquil (Alvarez).   From a population over a million, only 256,000 (ESPOL) people 
remain on the Peninsula, with the large majority deriving livelihoods from the tourism 
(beaches) and the shrimp industry.  Until very recently, virtually all agricultural land was 
organized into communal land holdings, known as comunas. With almost no exceptions, 
the approximately 70,000 (ESPOL) comuneros in the PSE live in poverty.  Per capita 
consumption by comuneros is $401,
 i less than a fourth than for the country as a whole 
and barely above the $1.00 per day international standard commonly employed as the 
dividing line between poverty and abject poverty.  
  With the expressed goals of assisting the comuneros and reviving the productivity 
of the PSE, in the 1980s the Government of Ecuador began a US$580 million irrigation 
project (ESPOL).
ii This project takes part into a regional program (Guayas River Basin 
and Peninsula of Santa Elena) with multiple purposes
iii involving water level regulation 
and utilization. The purpose related to this project is the transference of water from 
surplus to deficit areas. That way, water for the Peninsula would be pumped from two 
pumping stations (one in the Daule River and the other in the Chongón Reservoir) into a 120-kilometer system of primary canals and five reservoirs. It was estimated that, with 
construction by landowners of secondary systems, 50,000 hectares could be irrigated 
(ESPOL).  The large majority of the canals (around 100 km) were completed and filled 
with water as much as a decade ago and the last portions of the system (one more 
reservoir and three canals) are still in plan of being completed.  With the works finished 
so far, over 20,000 hectares could be irrigated (ESPOL), however only 6,000 hectares are 
currently under irrigation from the canals (ESPOL).   At least as troubling, virtually all of 
this production is by large growers who acquired their lands from the comunas. Indeed, 
the comunas have sold approximately 91% of potentially irrigable lands to such growers 
and land speculators.
iv    According to available anecdotal information, these sales were 
at prices well below the most conservative estimates of the present value of potential 
production. The majority of the prices for irrigable lands were between US$40 and $400 
per hectare (Castillo, 2003b).   In other words, the comunas sold their best lands at 
bargain basement prices.   
  The goal of the analyses presented in this paper was to investigate what happened.  
Did the economically powerful use political influence and even armed force to wrest 
lands from the comuneros?  Did comuneros sell their lands due to poor information about 
market opportunities for the products the canals made possible to produce and, by 
extension, the fair market value of their lands? Were the comuneros motivated by poverty 
or hedonism to surrender longer term gains in favor of small, but immediate 
compensation?  Was there corruption?   In some instances and to some degree, no doubt 
all of this happened.  But we will argue that the main cause was that the combination of 
the type of investment made by the Ecuadorian Government and the communal structure of the land holdings increased the valuation (i.e., the reservation price) of the land for 
those outside the comunas while, at the same time, lowering those valuations for the 
comuneros
v.   The resulting gap in valuations was greater the more suitable the lands for 
irrigation. It was this effect, primarily, which led the comuneros to the economically 
rational, though seemingly perverse, decisions to liquidate their best lands, even at low 
prices.    
Beyond explaining past events, these finding have relevance for the northwestern 
part of the PSE, where the final phase irrigation project is under construction and, more 
generally, for development projects worldwide where the intended beneficiaries hold 
resources communally. 
2. THE ANALYSIS 
A. Overview of Feder and Feeny Model 
The point of departure for our analysis is a simple, but rich and flexible model 
developed by Gershon Feder and David Feeny to explain investment, production, and 
land acquisition/retention decisions by peasants. Their model depicts a rural economy 
where there are private land holdings, but land rights are subject to risk.  A farmer is 
assumed to maximize expected utility, which is separable in two arguments: current 
consumption and the next period’s wealth. The maximization process involves allocating 
his/her initial endowment and borrowed funds among three uses: current consumption, 
land acquisition, and investment in physical capital. 
Some of the basic components and assumptions of the model follow: 
•  There is a two-period planning horizon.  Both periods are of indeterminate length.  •  Land acquisition/retention,
vi consumption, and investment decisions made in the 
first period determine production in the second period. 
•  Capital is completely used up in the process of production, i.e., by the end of 
Period 2. While we will not deviate from this assumption, its restrictive nature 
should be recognized.  In particular, the requirement that capital be exhausted 
denies the possibility of applying capital, in part, to increase the value of the land 
in anticipation of future sales. 
•  The utility function is linear in terminal wealth  
•  Risk to property rights is represented by a non-zero probability φ that the current 
farmer will lose both the Period 2 output and the land. 
•  The possibility of obtaining land through actions different from purchases is 
viewed as an exogenous probabilistic event.    
Notation of the model: 
T = quantity demanded of land 
P = price of land 
k = capital-land ratio   Note: Capital is a numeraire variable.  That is, Capital is $1 per  
      unit.  As such, k becomes the number of dollars of Capital used per unit of land. 
Co = first period consumption 
Wo = initial wealth 
φ = probability of ownership and output loss in the second period.  
U, Uo = total utility and Period 1 utility, respectively.  
y = monetary value of output per unit of land  
r = interest rate. In Period 1, land and capital are obtained (and/or retained) to produce the next 
period’s output.  The production function exhibits constant returns to scale in land and 
capital. The per hectare output is described in Equation 1.: 
(1)       y = y(k);  y’(k)>0; y’’(k)<0            
The utility of current consumption is a concave function with decreasing marginal utility, 
see equation 2: 
(2) Uo = Uo(Co); Uo’(Co)>0; Uo’’(Co)<0                
The amount of credit, S, available to a farmer is limited by the value of his/her 
land holdings (the only acceptable collateral) and by the degree of risk of losing the land, 
see equation 3: 
 (3)     S = s(φ)PT,                
   The proportion of land value lending institutions are willing to give as loans is s, 
0≤s≤1.  As would be expected, s is a function of the risk of land loss with s’<0.   
The farmer selects Co, T, and k so as to maximize total utility, see equation 4:  
(4)   Max U = Uo(Co) + [1-φ] T [y(k)+P] - [1 + r]s(φ)PT           
                             Co, T, k 
{Uo(Co)} is the utility of current consumption and {[1-φ]T[y(k)+P] -[1 + r]s(φ)PT} 
is the expected terminal wealth, that is, output plus land value times the probability that 
they will still be possessed at the end of period 2, minus debt repayment
vii.  This 
maximization is subject to a budget constraint whereby expenditures for land acquisition, 
capital investment, and current consumption cannot exceed initial wealth plus borrowed 
funds, see equation 5: (5)     Wo + s(φ)PT = kT + PT + Co                    
Solving for Co in equation 5 (i.e., Co = Wo + s(φ)PT - kT – PT) and substituting 
into the right-hand side of equation 4, the resulting maximization equation is presented in 
equation 6: 
(6)    Max U  = U(Wo - PT[1-s] - kT) + [1-φ] T [y(k)+P] - [1+r]s(φ)PT         
                    T, k   
The solution of the first and second order conditions to solve for the optimum 
values of T and k is presented in the Appendix.   Three important, though unsurprising, 
results which will be used in the following discussion are that heightened risk of 
dispossession (φ) reduces: 
The quantity demanded of land, i.e.,   dT  < 0   ;     
       dφ 
 
Per hectare capital usage, i.e.,  dk   < 0    and  
      d φ  
      
The equilibrium price of land, i.e., dP < 0     
                dφ 
Again, these results apply to an economy where credit is available to everybody 
using [and owning] land, and credit is related to land value and to security of land rights.   
We will now present modifications to the theoretical model to capture better conditions 
on PSE. 
B. Modifying the model to conditions on the Peninsula of Santa Elena 
Feder and Feeny modeled a situation in which there were essentially 
homogeneous agriculturalists determining the amounts of land, capital, and credit they 
would obtain, all subject to similar levels of risk and operating under similar incentive 
systems.  The situation on PSE was, and remains, quite different.  There are two distinct types of land users: the comuneros and the commercial farmers/land speculators or, more 
generally, non-comuneros.   
Comuneros:  Traditionally and by Ecuadorian law, virtually all rural land in PSE 
is held communally. Around 70 comunas are spread across PSE, all of them
viii having 
legal property over large extensions of land. They elect representatives and assign land 
usage rights to their members upon request. Land is usually exploited individually being 
benefits kept by the individual. Due to resource degradation and climatic changes 
resulting in near-desertification of much of the land, as well as the lure of job 
opportunities in urban areas, many comuneros migrated. For the remaining comuneros, 
while the land was not very productive, at least it was not in short supply.  Indeed, there 
were areas in many comunas that were either entirely unused or only used sporadically 
and/or at very low levels of intensity. With ef fectively a zero market price on lands, 
individual comuneros were virtually assured of secure usage rights on plots previously 
allocated to them by the comuna.   
Credit Market: Because comuneros had usage, but not individual ownership 
rights, ‘their’ land could not be employed as collateral.
ix  As such, Comuneros had 
effectively no access to credit.
x  In terms of the Feder and Feeny model, s= 0 and 
hence also S=0.    
Land Market:  Individual comuneros are not permitted to sell communal lands.  
This, combined with no access to credit markets, effectively precludes individual 
comuneros from the land markets.  However, acting as a community, usage rights 
can be altered and comuna lands may be sold to other parties or additional lands 
purchased.
xi   Unlike the farmers envisioned by Feder and Feeny, the amount of land, T, is not a decision variable nor is land part of a comunero’s wealth, Wo, i.e., 
for the individual comunero TP=0. As such, the comunero is reduced to one 
decision variable, k, because he/she has control over land use, but not over 
decisions to retain or sell the land. Therefore, the comunero faces a maximization 
problem as follows: 
(7)    Max U =  Uo(Wo -  kT) + [1-φ] T y(k)  ;     with    dk < 0         
            k                    dφ    
Direct impact of the canals: The primary constraint to increased agricultural 
productivity on the PSE is the low and irregular availability of water (Alvarez). 
The canals were intended to alleviate this problem.  However, to utilize this water 
effectively requires investment in secondary irrigation systems (i.e., pumps, pipes 
and/or secondary canals, sprinklers, drip irrigation systems, etc.). In terms of the 
model, the canals increased y’(k), the marginal impact of capital on yields (i.e., 
the slope of the yields curve), but this increase only applied beyond threshold 
levels necessary to provide the means for bringing water from the canals to the 
fields (see Figure 2).  With no significant attachable assets, reaching these 
thresholds was beyond the means of the comuneros and, as such, the canals were 
of minimal value, at best, for agricultural production.   
Non-comuneros: Non-comuneros include those interested in entering the PSE land 
market either to engage in agricultural production or for speculation.  Relative to 
comuneros, these are individuals with considerable financial means and political 
influence. Ironically, the Feder and Feeny model presented above, which was intended to 
describe peasants, can be employed without modification for this group.  
 Credit Market: This group clearly has access to credit markets both because, in 
general, these individuals already owned attachable assets not on PSE and could 
also use lands purchased on PSE for collateral.
xii  To the extent lands can be used 
for collateral, non-comuneros would derive a collateral premium
xiii.    
Land Markets:  Due to tradition and vagaries in Ecuadorian law, there has been 
some question regarding the legality of individuals purchasing communal lands, 
even with community approval.  Despite of this, since initiation of the irrigation 
project sales have become common.
xiv As such, non-comuneros have effective 
access to land markets in PSE. 
Direct impacts of the canals: Unlike the comuneros, the non-comuneros had 
access to the sufficient capital to use the canals to increase agricultural yields.   
C. Explaining the sales of irrigable lands 
As described in the introduction, the building of the canals did not bring an 
agricultural and economic renaissance to the comunas, but rather the sale of almost all 
potentially irrigable lands to non-comuneros.  These events may be readily explained 
employing the Feder and Feeny model, with the just-described modifications for the 
comuneros.  A schematic of the following discussion is presented in Figure 3.  
Prior to the development of the canals, non-comuneros had little interest in land 
held by the comunas, due to its low productivity.  Moreover, as there was a large supply 
relative to the population, individual comuneros had secure usage rights.  The primary 
canals increased the productive potential of the land if and only if sufficient, i.e., 
threshold level of, capital was applied to facilitate delivery of water from the canals to the 
fields (see Figure 2). As the land was held communally, regardless of the productive potential of the lands they used, comuneros could not secure sufficient credit to acquire 
threshold levels of capital needed to exploit the canals. But non-comuneros could.   
Therefore, due to the enhanced productive potential of the land, the canals precipitated an 
outward shift of the demand for land, with all of that increase being from the non-
comuneros. 
Because of the communal nature of the land tenure, non-comuneros had to 
negotiate with comunas, as a whole, for land parcels, rather than with the individual 
comuneros who had usage rights to the land.  If proper procedures were followed, 
decisions to sell were based on community-wide voting or objective deliberations by 
legitimate representatives of the community.  If there was corruption, as has been alleged 
in some cases, individuals holding authority in a community might have approved sales 
for personal gain, rather than purely from considerations of public welfare.  Either way, 
individual comuneros holding rights over irrigable lands did not fully control the process. 
As such, these individuals were at risk of dispossession, a risk that effectively did not 
exist before the canals were built.    
Due to this increased risk of dispossession, incentives to make capital investments 
over the land were further diminished, i.e., (dk/dφ)<0. Comunero demands for these lands 
would have fallen due to the combination of 1. heightened risk of dispossession, i.e., 
(dT/dφ)<0;
xv 2. reduced incentives to make land investments, and 3. that property values 
are not part of the wealth of individual comuneros using the lands, i.e., TP=0.  
With the coming of the canals, the demand for irrigable lands rose for non-
comuneros. As the supply of these lands was fixed, the maximum prices they were 
willing to pay for their purchase rose, as well as their willingness to incur in transaction costs involved in negotiating with comuneros (several times bribing comuna 
representatives). At the same time and as a result of this rise in demand on the part of 
non-comuneros (which increased dispossession risk) demands fell for comuneros, i.e., the 
minimums they were willing to accept as compensation for losing use of the lands fell. 
Reservation price gaps developed, with potential buyers willing to pay more than the 
minimum acceptable to potential sellers.  These reservation price gaps would have been 
wider (and incentives for sales greater) the more suitable the lands for irrigation and the 
greater the resulting yield enhancements.  The expected result of this process is consistent 
with what actually occurred, systematic selling by comunas of the lands having the 
greatest potentials through exploitation of the canals. 
D. Comment on low sale prices  
  Reservation price gaps between non-comuneros and comuneros explain the land 
sales, but not sale prices as low as $40.00 per hectare for irrigable lands (see Castillo, 
2003b). Why haven’t the comuneros been better negotiators?  It seems likely that the 
communal structure of the landownership contributed to this outcome. As the voluminous 
transactions cost literature attests, negotiating is not free. Any individual comunero 
devoting resources to negotiate a better price would have shared the fruits of that activity 
with all comuneros,
xvi the classic positive externality/free rider problem.  Moreover, in 
most cases only a portion of comuna land was potentially irrigable. Comuneros with 
usage rights on non-irrigable portions had little or nothing to lose from sales of irrigable 
lands and, indeed, could only benefit from those lands if there were sales. For these 
individuals, reservation prices may have been exceedingly low.       That the communal structure may have contributed to very poor realized sales 
terms is only the icing on this dismal cake.  The sales were due to the reservation price 
gaps.  The reservation price gaps were due primarily to the enhancement of returns from 
capital brought about by the canals and comunero credit constraints [as land and any 
improvements could not be attached] and secondarily to dispossession risk to the users of 
those lands
xvii.  As long as these conditions existed, the sales were probably inevitable.  
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
  The analysis of PSE has highlighted three aspects of communal asset ownership 
systems, that: 
1.  Users of communal assets cannot consider the market value to be part of their own 
wealth. 
2.  Users of communal assets normally face severe credit constraints as they are unable 
to employ the assets they use as collateral.  As a result, feasible levels of capital 
improvements tend to be low.   
3.  Sales of portions of communal assets are decided by the entire community, through 
either direct vote or representatives, and not solely by those individuals using those 
portions of the assets.  As such, when purchase offers are made to the community, 
individual users are at risk of involuntary dispossession. 
In PSE these factors led to near-complete divestiture by the comunas of lands 
potentially irrigable from the primary canals.  The canals enhanced returns from [above 
threshold] applications of capital on irrigable lands.  Because of the canals, those able to 
acquire capital, i.e., non-comuneros, had an advantage in the use of those lands relative to 
comuneros. Given this, sales of irrigable lands to non-comuneros were rational.     There are two main implications of this work for development policy.   The first is 
consistent with the broad consensus views of development literature and practitioners, 
that private ownership is usually superior to communal systems.  In the case of PSE, we 
do not assert that had the land been privately owned there would not have been sales to 
outsiders.  Rather, if the lands had been privately owned, an owner would have had: 
1.  Greater scope for exploiting the canals, as he/she could have used the land for 
collateral.       
2.  More incentives to invest in the land due to lower dispossession risk and the ability to 
capture the value of improvements (through earnings stream enhancements or higher 
land values). 
3.  Stronger negotiating positions, as well as greater incentives to secure the best terms, 
if they elected to sell the land.  
As a general rule, communal asset holders should be encouraged to privatize or, at 
least, develop institutions that facilitate improved management along the lines of 
cooperative or corporate structures. 
The second implication is that when assets are communally held, development 
programs that can be best exploited by clients through applications of capital may trigger 
divestiture of those assets. This suggests that a bias in favor of labor-intensive 
development may be particularly appropriate when there are communal holdings.   
Alternatively, safeguards may be necessary when interventions favor the use of capital.  
These may include oversight of asset transfers and/or lending programs to facilitate credit 
access.                                                                                                                                                                             
i Comunero consumption estimate from Castillo, 2003b.  Ecuadorian consumption average from World 
Bank. 
ii Another goal of the project was to supply water for residential and industrial purposes. 
iii The purposes of such program cover irrigation, water distribution, water level control, water quality 
control, and the generation of electricity.  This program is considered of great importance for the country 
because of the Organization of American States’ qualification of the Guayas River Basin as the “South 
American most important hydrographic region”. Comisión de Estudios para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del 
Río Guayas, 1996. The semiarid conditions of the Peninsula of Santa Elena, its potential agricultural 
productivity, and the fact that it borders the Guayas River Basin, encouraged the Government to include it 
into the program.  
iv Interview with Jaime Proaño from CEDEGE, 2000. Also Castillo (2003b), studying four comunas where 
the canals had been built, found that virtually all irrigable lands had been sold, accounting for nearly two 
thirds of all lands formerly held by these Comunas.  
v Note that we are talking about reservation prices, not market value. 
vi In their discussion, Feder and Feeny begin period 1 with the farmer having no land and an initial amount 
of wealth, Wo.   However, by a trivial extension of the model, a portion of Wo can be specified as being 
land.  
vii As an aside, this formulation suggests risk neutrality, that is unless the φ assumed by a farmer is biased 
upwards (risk averseness) or downward (risk loving).   
viii There are just a few exceptions where comunas are still in process of legalization.  
ix In addition, as long as the productive potential of the lands was low, their value as collateral would, 
likewise, have been low or even nil.   
x Through informal channels and some NGOs, comuneros actually have access to credit, but loan amounts 
are typically very small, see Castillo (2003a). Moreover, the Government did not provide special credit 
programs to facilitate exploitation of the canals by comuneros. 
xi In practice, prior to building the canals, comunas almost never bought or sold land.  
xii It should be noted that this group bears a non-zero, though probably small, risk of dispossession (φ) from 
potential challenges to the legality of some of the purchases of communal lands.                                                                                                                                                                                
xiii Feder and Feeny define collateral premium as “the result of the owner’s ability to obtain additional and 
cheaper credit by pledging the land as collateral.” p248 
xiv If and the extent to which this resulted from appropriate and inappropriate uses of political and economic 
influence remains and open question. 
xv This change in T due to a higher risk (φ) applies to the community as a whole as T is not a decision 
variable for the individual comunero. 
xvi As that negotiator would have received his/her share of sales revenue. 
xvii Carter and Salgado also suggest this result when asserting that “capital-constrained” individuals have a 
smaller shadow price of the land than unconstrained individuals, which makes their demand for land lower. 
When high risk of losing land is added, they conclude, “the competitiveness dampening effects of credit 
constraints are likely to be enhanced.” (p256), further reducing demands for land. APPENDIX 1: 
OPTIMIZATION SOLUTION FOR THE FEDER AND FEENY MODEL 
  The solution for determining optimum values of k and T, as well as the impacts of 
changes in selected parameters are presented in this Appendix. Equation 6, from the text, 
is repeated below.   
(6)  Max U  = U(Wo - PT[1-s] - kT) + [1-φ] T [y(k)+P] - [1+r]s(φ)PT          
                  T, k   
 
At the optimal values of T and k, the first-order derivatives have to equal zero.  
The expression above is hereafter referred to as F.   For the first order conditions, see 
equations 1a and 2a:  
 
(1a)     ∂F = [1-φ] [y + P] - U’ {P[1-s] + k} - [1 + r] s(φ)P = 0         
                        ∂T 
 
(2a)      ∂F = [1-φ]Ty’ – TU’ = 0                 
                         ∂k 
 
To verify that the choice of T and k maximizes the utility function, the first 
element (first row, first column) of the Hessian needs to be negative and the determinant 
of the matrix positive (see equation 3a). 
 
(3a)          [H]     =   U’’{P[1-s]+k}
2  U’’{P[1-s]+k}T                 
                                      U’’ {P[1-s]+k}T   T[1-φ]y’’+ T
2U’’ 
 
The first element is:  U’’{P[1-s]+k}
2 < 0.  
The determinant is:  ∆ = T[1-φ] U’’{P[1-s] + k}
2 y’’> 0 
Once the second-order conditions are satisfied, the model can be used to analyze 
how the optimal choice functions react to changes in the parameter P.  Differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to P and arranging the terms into matrix form, yields 
equation 4a: 
 
                                    dT            [1-φ] [y-y’k]/P – U’’ {[1-s]P+k}[1-s]T 
                                    dP                 
         (4a)            [H]              =             
                                    dk                       -T
2U’’[1-s] 
                                    dP                 
 
Using Cramer’s rule yields equations 5a and 6a: 
 
(5a)  dT = 1{[1-φ] [[y-ky’]/P] [T[1-φ]y’’+T
2U’’] – U’’[[1-s]P + k] T
2[1-s][1-φ]y’’}<0       
        dP    ∆ 
and 
(6a)          dk = 1 {-[1-φ] {[y-y’k]/P} U’’ {[1-s]P+k}T > 0             
                dP    ∆ 
 
Equation 5a indicates that the quantity demanded of T is negatively related to 
price, i.e., a downward sloping demand curve for land.  Equation 6a demonstrates that the 
capital-land ratio, k, is positively related to the price of land as farmers substitute capital 
for land. 
    The model can also be employed to show that the optimal choice of T is 
negatively affected by an increase in the risk to ownership if land prices are held fixed, 
see equations 7a and 8a: 
 
(7a)               dT                y + P – {[1-φ] y’ – [1 + r]}Ps’ + TU’’ {[1-s]P + k}Ps’         
                     dφ            
       [H]        =               
                     dk                 Ty’+ T
2U’’Ps’ 
                     dφ            
 
 (8a)        dT =  1 {{[y + P – {[1-φ] y’ – [1 + r]}Ps’ + TU’’ {[1-s]P + k}Ps’}T[1-φ] y’’        
              dφ      ∆       + T
2[1 + r]s PU’’/[1-φ] – T
2U’’[[1-φ]y’- [1 + r]]Ps’}  < 0 
 
The expression {[1-φ] y’ – [1 + r]} is greater than zero because the credit 
constraint is assumed to be binding.  This means that the expected marginal productivity 
of the land has to be greater than the cost of capital for the individual to be willing to ask 
for credit. 
Because the demand for land is downward sloping, and given that the supply of 
land is fixed, there is an equilibrium price for land that depends on φ, the probability of 
losing land. In other words, if the demand for land is reduced after an increase in φ, the 
equilibrium price of land declines, see equation 9a.  
(9a)    dP =  - [dT/dφ]  < 0             
            dφ        [dT/dP]           
          
   Through its negative effect on the price of land, the capital-land ratio, k, also is 
negatively affected by an increase in the risk to ownership, see equation 10a. 
 
(10a) dk = dk + dk dP = dk – dk [dT/dφ] = {Ty’[1- φ][y-y’k]/P+ T2U’’[1-s] {Py’[1-s] + y’k - y     
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